judgment of the Court, STEYN CJ endorsed the interpretation of TROLLIP J in the following words (at p 351 E): "The question is whether the evidence shows that the user was not bona fide in the sense contemplated in sec. 136. I do not propose to attempt a comprehensive definition of what the expression "no bona fide user" means in this section. Whatever the full meaning of the phrase may be, it seems clear that user for an ulterior purpose, unassociated with a genuine intention of pursuing the object for which 56 the Act allows the registration of a trade mark and protects its use, cannot pass as a bona fide user. It seems to me that some assistance may be derived, by way of analogy, from this case in regard to the interpretation of s. 46 (b) of the Act. Having regard to the aforegoing and without attempting to give an exact or comprehensive definition of what constitutes a bona fide description for the purposes of s. 46 (b), it seems to me that what the Legislature intended to safeguard by means of the provisions of the subsection is the use by a trader, in relation to his goods, of words, which are fairly descriptive of his goods, genuinely for the purpose of describing the character or quality of the goods: 57. the use of the words must not be a mere device to secure some ulterior object, as for example where the words are used in order to take advantage of the goodwill attaching to the registered trade mark of another. In the case before us the evidence establishes that the word "mica" is not one generally used in the paint trade to describe paint products (cf. the Coca-Cola Co of Canada Ld v Pepsi-Cola of Canada Ld, (1942) 59 RPC 127, at p 133). Appellant's predecessor in title hit upon the idea of using the word "mica" to create the. composite word "Micatex" for use as a trade mark; and appellant used this mark for