Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 7 THOMAS, J., dissenting will conclude that the communication contains a threat as a matter of law. Instead, like one who mails an “obscene” publication and is prosecuted under the federal obscenity statute, a defendant prosecuted under §875(c) must know only the words used in that communication, along with their ordinary meaning in context. General intent divides those who know the facts consti­ tuting the actus reus of this crime from those who do not. For example, someone who transmits a threat who does not know English—or who knows English, but perhaps does not know a threatening idiom—lacks the general intent required under §875(c). See Ragansky, supra, at 645 (“[A] foreigner, ignorant of the English language, repeating [threatening] words without knowledge of their meaning, may not knowingly have made a threat”). Like­ wise, the hapless mailman who delivers a threatening letter, ignorant of its contents, should not fear prosecution. A defendant like Elonis, however, who admits that he “knew that what [he] was saying was violent” but suppos­ edly “just wanted to express [him]self,” App. 205, acted with the general intent required under §875(c), even if he did not know that a jury would conclude that his commu­ nication constituted a “threat” as a matter of law. Demanding evidence only of general intent also corre­ sponds to §875(c)’s statutory backdrop. As previously discussed, before the enactment of §875(c), courts had read the Presidential threats statute to require proof only of general intent. Given Congress’ presumptive awareness of this application of the Presidential threats statute—not to mention this Court’s similar approach in the obscenity context, see Rosen, 161 U. S., at 41–42—it is difficult to conclude that the Congress that enacted §875(c) in 1939 understood it to contain an implicit mental-state require­ ment apart from general intent. There is certainly no textual evidence to support this conclusion. If anything, the text supports the opposite inference, as §875(c), unlike