C.P. No. 3506/2020 11 upon obtaining and considering the opinion of a Council of Complaints. We find that this argument has been made without appreciating the difference between the powers of the Councils of Complaints under subsection (2) and subsection (5) of Section 26 of the PEMRA Ordinance. The power of the Councils of Complaints under subsection (2), to receive and review “complaints against any aspects of programmes” and to render “opinion on such complaints”, is a power distinct from its power under subsection (5) to recommend action of censure or fine, which is in addition to its power of rendering an opinion on any aspect of the programme complained of. Indeed, a Council of Complaints cannot recommend the action of prohibiting the broadcast or rebroadcast of any programme, and the appropriateness of taking such an action is to be decided by PEMRA by itself, but it can do so only after receiving or obtaining, as the case may be, and considering the opinion of the Council of Complaints concerned on the objectionable aspect of the programme as per Section 26(2) of the PEMRA Ordinance read with the Councils of Complaints Rules. 16. The attention of the Court was also invited to the proviso to Section 30(1)(b) of the PEMRA Ordinance, in support of the contention that the legislature has provided expressly where it intended PEMRA to act after obtaining and considering the opinion of a Council of Complaints, and that the absence of such a provision in Section 27(a) suggests that PEMRA is to act under Section 27(a) independent of any opinion of a Council of Complaints. This contention is based upon a reading of the various provisions of the PEMRA Ordinance in isolation of each other and upon their fragmented interpretation, which approach rarely leads to a correct understanding of the meaning and scope of a particular provision of law. This Court has, therefore, always preferred the approach of holistic interpretation to that of fragmented interpretation while interpreting any provision of the Constitution8 or a statute9. By this approach, the courts seek to ascertain the overall intent and purpose of the law and, by considering how its individual provisions fit within its larger framework, attempt to harmonize their meaning and scope with each other. In making the said contention, it has not been noticed that even in Section 29(6), which empowers PEMRA to impose fine on a licensee who contravenes any of the provisions of the PEMRA Ordinance, or of the rules or regulations made thereunder, no provision like proviso to Section 30(1)(b) is provided for and despite this omission, no one has argued, and perhaps rightly so, 8 Munir Bhatti v. Federation PLD 2011 SC 407; D.B.A., Rawalpindi v. Federation PLD 2015 SC 401; Reference No.1 of 2020 PLD 2021 SC 825. 9 Waqar Bakhtawari v. Mazhar Shah PLD 2018 SC 81 (Previous cases are cited in it).