HURBAIN v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT (ii) Terminology used 175. As regards terminology, the Court observes that a number of terms have been used to denote the variety of means deployed in order to give effect to the “right to be forgotten” to which the domestic courts referred (see also Biancardi, cited above, § 53). Generally speaking, the “right to be forgotten” may give rise in practice to various measures that can be taken by search engine operators or by news publishers. These relate either to the content of an archived article (for instance, the removal, alteration or anonymisation of the article) or to limitations on the accessibility of the information. In the latter case, limitations on access may be put in place by both search engines and news publishers. In the interests of clarity and consistency, in the present judgment the Court will use the term “delisting” to refer to measures taken by search engine operators, and the term “de-indexing” to denote measures put in place by the news publisher responsible for the website on which the article in question is archived (ibid., §§ 55-56). (b) General principles (i) Article 10 and the protection of digital press archives 176. The Court has consistently held that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to Article 10 § 2, it applies not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”. As enshrined in Article 10, freedom of expression is subject to exceptions which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly (see Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 101, ECHR 2012; Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 88; and Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, § 48, 29 March 2016). 177. As regards press freedom, although the press must not overstep certain bounds, particularly as regards the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest. Thus the task of imparting information necessarily includes “duties and responsibilities”, as well as limits which the press must impose on itself spontaneously (see Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 89, and Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 102). 178. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of “public watchdog” (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, §§ 59 and 62, 61