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HURBAIN v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT of his or her “private life” (see, as a recent authority, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, § 97, 25 September 2018). However, as in other spheres protected by Article 8, in order for that provision to come into play an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and be made in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life. This requirement pertains to both social and professional reputation. Likewise, Article 8 cannot be relied on in order to complain of a loss of reputation which is the foreseeable consequence of one’s own actions, such as the commission of a criminal offence. This rule is not limited to reputational damage but has been expanded to a wider principle according to which any personal, social, psychological and economic suffering that could be foreseeable consequences of the commission of a criminal offence cannot be relied on in order to complain that a criminal conviction in itself amounts to an interference with the right to respect for “private life”. This extended principle should cover not only criminal offences but also other misconduct entailing a measure of legal responsibility with foreseeable negative effects on “private life” (ibid., §§ 98 and 112). 190. The Court further reiterates that where there has been compilation of data on a particular individual, processing or use of personal data or publication of the material concerned in a manner or degree beyond that normally foreseeable, private-life considerations arise. The Court has acknowledged that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention (see Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, §§ 136-37, 27 June 2017). It has also held that Article 8 of the Convention provides for the right to a form of informational self-determination, allowing individuals to rely on their right to privacy as regards data which, albeit neutral, are collected, processed and disseminated collectively and in such a form or manner that their Article 8 rights may be engaged (ibid., § 137). 191. For a number of years now, with the development of technology and communication tools, a growing number of persons have sought to protect their interests under what is known as the “right to be forgotten”. This is based on the individual’s interest in obtaining the erasure or alteration of, or the limitation of access to, past information that affects the way in which he or she is currently perceived. By seeking to have that information disappear, the persons concerned wish to avoid being confronted indefinitely with their past actions or public statements, in a variety of contexts such as, for instance, job-seeking and business relations. 192. It is clear that personal information that is published and has been available on the Internet for some time may have a far-reaching negative impact on how the person concerned is perceived by public opinion. There is also a risk of other harmful effects: firstly, the aggregation of information, which may lead to the creation of a profile of the person concerned (in that 65

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Hurbain v. Belgium

Case Law

Country

Belgium

Country Location

Latitude: 50.855421148205785

Longitude: 4.557127118111282

Country Location (linked Case Law): Belgium

Decision Date: Jul 4, 2023

Case Status: Closed

Case Outcome (Procedural)

Inadmissible
Motion Denied

Case Outcome (Disposition)

Injunction, Order, or Motion Denied/Vacated

Keywords

Access to Information
Digital Rights
Freedom of Press
Media/Press
Privacy, Data Protection and Retention
Right to be Forgotten

Judicial Body: European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)

Court Name: The Grand Chamber, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)

Case Number: Application no. 57292/16

Case Summary: The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in a majority judgment, held that an order to anonymise an article in a newspaper’s electronic archive (which referred to a person’s involvement in a fatal road traffic accident for which they were subsequently convicted) did not breach the applicant publisher’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicant, Patrick Hurbain’s newspaper Le Soir published an article reporting on a series of fatal car accidents which had occurred in a short period of time. It mentioned the full name of one of the drivers involved, “G” who successfully sued the applicant and received an order in their favour. The ECtHR upheld the decision of the domestic courts and emphasized that a person who is not a public figure may acquire notoriety in the context of a criminal process/trial but that may decline with the passage of time, with the effect that they may be able to rely on the right to be forgotten in order to go back to being someone who is unknown to the public. In reaching such conclusion, the court tailored a seven-criteria test which is to be applied in right to be forgotten cases.

Case Significance: Decision (including concurring or dissenting opinions) establishes influential or persuasive precedent outside its jurisdiction.

In this judgment the Grand Chamber has provided important clarification as to the approach to be taken to “right to be forgotten” requests directed towards content providers and, in particular, towards media archives. The judgment provides clear criteria for deciding whether or not a right to be forgotten request should be accepted by the operators of a media archive. Those criteria have been specifically tailored to cases in which “right to be forgotten” requests are made against content providers rather than search engines.

Attention is drawn to the following points in relation to “right to be forgotten” clams:

The right is not likely to be available in respect of reports of the most serious criminal offences, or ones of historical or statistical significance.

The longer the time that has passed the stronger the claim will be.

Current contribution to a debate of public interest is not decisive – historical and scientific value is also important.

There must be a properly duly substantiated claim of serious harm to private life – rehabilitation is important but not enough on its own.

The measure which is least restrictive of press freedom must be used.

The majority were not persuaded that by the dissenters view that the Court should recognise an Article 10 “right to remember” (see in particular the concurring opinion of Judge Krenc, at [23]).

The Grand Chamber’s approach is very similar to that which is undertaken in a right to erasure case brought under Article 17 of the UK GDPR. Article 17(3) provides for erasure requests to be refused where the processing is necessary for exercising the right to freedom of expression and information and for archiving; that demands a balancing exercise. The European Data Protection Board’s Guidelines 5/2019 on the criteria of the Right to be Forgotten in the search engines cases under the GDPR (part 1) [pdf] and the CJEU have laid down criteria for this balancing exercise (e.g., C-136/17 GC v CNIL [77]). The Strasbourg Court and the CJEU have embraced each other’s jurisprudence in this context and it is likely that the outcome of the balancing exercise would be the same under both regimes.

Decisions of the Court of Human Rights are persuasive but not binding in domestic law but Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention are the “very content” of the tort of misuse of private information and a definitive decision on the balancing of these rights is one which the English courts are likely to follow.

Although the decision has attracted criticism from free speech campaigners such as Media Defence and Article 19 the Grand Chamber struck a careful balance between free speech and privacy rights. As noted above, the Grand Chamber considered that the obligation for a publisher to anonymise an article that had been published initially in a lawful manner fell within the “duties and responsibilities” of the press which are expressly referred to in Article 10(2). The decision confirms that media organisations need not proactively monitor their archives on an ongoing basis or go back and remove names from historical articles. As is the case under data protection law, they need only assess the competing rights and interests in response to a right to be forgotten request.

The judgment suggests that right to be forgotten requests/claims may be more likely to be regarded as proportionate (and thus succeed) where they are narrowly targeted to focus on getting an article anonymised rather than removed entirely. The case makes it clear that a person seeking to invoke the “right to be forgotten” in respect of media archives faces a substantial hurdle. This is likely to be difficult to overcome in the case of a public figure or someone involved in an event of historical significance.

Related Caselaw (self)

Source URL: Global Freedom of Expression

Collection

CIPIT
Columbia

Date Updated: Jan 30, 2024

Primary Documents

CASE-OF-HURBAIN-v.-BELGIUM-1.pdf
English
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CYRILLA: Global Digital Rights Law

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Hurbain v. Belgium

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