GLUKHIN v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT could not therefore serve as the legal basis for the measures taken in the present case, which concerned an administrative offence. 81. Both the CAO and the Police Act gave powers to the police to investigate administrative offences and to collect evidence, including evidence containing personal data (see paragraphs 26-29 above). Decree no. 410 provided for the installation of live facial recognition CCTV cameras in the Moscow underground which were accessible to the police (see paragraphs 33-34 above). The Court therefore accepts that the measures taken against the applicant had a legal basis in the domestic law. 82. In so far as the applicant alleged that the domestic law did not meet the “quality of law” requirement, the Court considers that it is essential in the context of implementing facial recognition technology to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned. 83. The Court has strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions meet the “quality of law” requirement. It notes, in particular, that the domestic law permits the processing of biometric personal data “in connection with the administration of justice” (see paragraph 31 above). This legal provision is widely formulated. Taking into account that the Government did not refer to any authoritative interpretation of that provision by the Supreme or Constitutional Courts or submit any examples of its restrictive interpretation and application in administrative and judicial practice, it appears that it allows processing of biometric personal data – including with the aid of facial recognition technology – in connection with any judicial proceedings. The domestic law does not contain any limitations on the nature of situations which may give rise to the use of facial recognition technology, the intended purposes, the categories of people who may be targeted, or on processing of sensitive personal data. Furthermore, the Government did not refer to any procedural safeguards accompanying the use of facial recognition technology in Russia, such as the authorisation procedures, the procedures to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained, supervisory control mechanisms and available remedies. 84. The Court will further proceed on the assumption that the contested measures pursued the legitimate aim of the prevention of crime. 85. The Court finds it to be beyond dispute that the fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today’s European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification. However, while it recognises the importance of such techniques in the detection and investigation of crime, the Court must delimit the scope of its examination. The question is not whether the processing of biometric personal data by facial recognition technology may in general be regarded as justified under the Convention. The only issue to be considered by the Court 26