face of it, without even properly examining the same. It is stated that summoning is contrary to the settled principles of law since the Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and must satisfy itself that the ingredients of the alleged offence are made out, which was not done in this case. It is argued that a bare perusal of the retweet in question would show that the same does not constitute any offence of defamation as the offence of defamation, besides the requirement of mens rea, should consist of three essential ingredients i.e. (i) making or publishing any imputation concerning any person, (ii) such imputations must have been made by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations, and (iii) the said imputation must have been made with the intention to harm or with knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person concerned. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the impugned orders failed to appreciate that the alleged re-tweet was not done with intent to harm respondent no. 2, nor was it likely to harm him in any manner. It is further argued that the learned Trial Court has failed to consider that admittedly, the entire version deposed by PW-2 is hearsay, and an expression of dismay is not defamation. It is contended that the best case as alleged by the respondent no. 2 is that the petitioner has retweeted a link of some video, of which neither the petitioner was creator/author nor publisher of the same, and thus, essential ingredients of the defamation are not attracted in the present case as the same would not amount to publication in terms of ingredients of Section 499 of IPC. It is also stated that the learned Trial Court, while Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN Signing Date:05.02.2024 16:25:50 CRL.M.C. 6347/2019 Page 10 of 50