justice. They must not only interpret the law but also possess the foresight to anticipate evolving strategies aimed at circumventing legal consequences. 59. It has to be noted that a person retweeting a defamatory content, which has the potential of causing reputational injury to a person, cannot wriggle out of his responsibility by merely contending that it was a retweet and not the original tweet. Accepting this view as canvassed by the petitioner would amount to permitting people to retweet any objectionable or defamatory content in cyberspace and social media platforms, without any responsibility being attached to their act of posting such content on social media even if the content has the potential to cause reputational injury to another. 60. The retweeting of the content in the present case which was originally created by some other person who did not have as much public following as the present petitioner, by virtue of the petitioner retweeting that content, represented to the public at large that he believed the content created by another person to be true. It has to be held so since the general public would ordinarily believe that the person retweeting such content on his own Twitter account, must have understood, verified and believed the content to be true. The critical issue to be taken note of in such circumstances is the fact that the petitioner who retweeted the content had much larger following than the original content creator, thus, having multiplied potential of spreading the defamatory content to a much larger audience. 61. The freedom of expression is essential in a democratic setup to spread one’s opinion, however, it cannot extend to the extent of Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN Signing Date:05.02.2024 16:25:50 CRL.M.C. 6347/2019 Page 37 of 50