468 Peguam Negara Malaysia v. MKINI Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 2 MLRA Code. No prohibited content nor any content in contravention Malaysian law are condoned. [121] With respect, the respondents had misconstrued the true position of the law found both in CMA and the Code. We are of the considered view that the 1st respondent was in fact not in compliance with the Code and shields its liabilities by its piecemeal reading of its provisions. [122] The overriding general principles and the underlying purpose of the Content Code should be viewed holistically. Far from complying with the Content Code, Malaysiakini may have breached the real objective of the Content Code. Viewed in this way, we are unable to accept that this Code can act as an armour to protect the respondents or any publisher being an ICH from any liability in the event where contemptuous comments were made by a third party subscribers that were published by the said ICH. Finding Of Liability Of The 1st Respondent [123] The law is trite and settled that the burden of proving contempt of court lies throughout with the party who makes the allegation, in this case the AG as the applicant. The standard of proof required is the criminal standard of proof of beyond any reasonable doubt (see Wee Choo Keong v. MBf Holdings Bhd & Anor And Another Appeal [1995] 2 MLRA 684). [124] We have not overlooked that it being criminal in character, there is a need to proceed cautiously before making a finding of guilt in this case. For, ultimately a person who is held in contempt is liable to be imprisoned or fined. This Court in PCP Construction Sdn Bhd v. Leap Modulation Sdn Bhd; Asian International Arbitration Centre (Intervener) [2019] 3 MLRA 429 held that the test to be applied is the objective test and not the mens rea test. It is stated at para 61 that the only requirement is that the publication of the impugned articles is intentional. Hence there is no necessity to prove an intention to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or the Judiciary. [125] A subjective intention of the alleged contemnor is difficult to establish since it entails an inquiry into the inner workings of the alleged contemnor’s mind. Thus it would not matter whether the publisher intends the result. It therefore is no defence for the publisher to claim that he did not know if the statements would have the effect of undermining or erode public in the administration of justice. [126] The facts before us are that the 1st respondent having designed its own internet platform cannot rely on the failure of its self-designed safeguards both at pre and post-publication stage as its defence. Its well-structured reporting had also failed to alert them of the danger and failed in exonerating it from being guilty of publishing contemptuous comments. There was nothing else to suggest of any other effort on the part of the 1st respondent except to remain oblivious to such danger with the hope of passing that responsibility to its own third party subscribers.