Niemela v. Malamas Page 32 authorize the appearance of the snippets on the user’s screen “in any meaningful sense” but “has merely, by the provision of its search service, played the role of a [107] In summary on this issue, I conclude that Google is a passive instrument and not a publisher of snippets. There is accordingly no issue for trial in relation to defamation. [108] I emphasize that I have not been asked in this case to consider whether Google could be a publisher of snippets and search results after notice of defamatory content. In the present case, Mr. Niemela initially raised this issue in his notice of application but abandoned the argument when Google voluntarily blocked the URLs that produced the offending snippets. Accordingly, the issue does not arise on the facts of this case. iv. Injurious Falsehood [109] The elements of the tort of injurious falsehood are described in Brown on Defamation, vol. 9, ch 28 at 28-5 as: (1) A false statement disparaging the plaintiff’s business, goods or property; (2) published to a third person; (3) maliciously and without just cause or excuse; and (4) resulting in special damages in the form of pecuniary loss. [110] Publication is an essential element of this tort. I conclude that this cause of action has no prospect of succeeding at trial based on my finding that the production of hyperlinks and snippets in search results does not constitute publication by Google. I therefore dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for injurious falsehood. 2015 BCSC 1024 (CanLII) facilitator”: at para. 51.