Case: 21-51178 Document: 00516474571 Page: 39 Date Filed: 09/16/2022 No. 21-51178 D. We have no doubts that Section 7 is constitutional. But even if some were to remain, 47 U.S.C. § 230 would extinguish them. Section 230 provides that the Platforms “shall [not] be treated as the publisher or speaker” of content developed by other users. Id. § 230(c)(1). Section 230 reflects Congress’s judgment that the Platforms do not operate like traditional publishers and are not “speak[ing]” when they host usersubmitted content. Congress’s judgment reinforces our conclusion that the Platforms’ censorship is not speech under the First Amendment. Congress enacted Section 230 in 1996 to ease uncertainty regarding online platforms’ exposure to defamation liability for the content they host. One leading case, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), held that an online platform could not be liable absent knowledge of the defamatory statements, because it was a distributor that did not exercise meaningful editorial control. See id. at 139–40. But then a different case, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), accepted an argument very similar to the Platforms’ argument here. It noted that Prodigy’s online platform had “content guidelines” prohibiting certain obscene and offensive content. Id. at *2. And Prodigy used an “automatic software screening program” as well as manual review “to delete notes from its computer bulletin boards” that violated the guidelines. Id. at *4. The court held that this conduct “constitute[d] editorial control” over the platform, so the platform was akin to a newspaper and Prodigy could be held liable for defamation on that basis. Ibid. Congress disagreed with Stratton Oakmont and abrogated it by enacting § 230. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (“One of the specific purposes of [§ 230] is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as 39