29/09/2023, 12:35
SANCHEZ v. FRANCE - 45581/15 (Judgment : No Article 10 - Freedom of expression-{general} : Grand Chamber) [2023] ECHR 418 (1…
4. Whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society
(a) General principles
(i) Freedom of expression
145. The general principles concerning the question whether a given
interference is “necessary in a democratic society” are well established in
the Court’s case-law and can be summed up as follows (see, among many
other authorities, NIT S.R.L., cited above, § 177, Perinçek, cited above,
§§ 196‑197, and Delfi AS, cited above, § 131):
“(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each
individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not
only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or
disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without
which there is no ‘democratic society’. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is
subject to exceptions, which ... must, however, be construed strictly, and the need
for any restrictions must be established convincingly ...
(ii) The adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the
existence of a ‘pressing social need’. The Contracting States have a certain margin
of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand
with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions
applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore
empowered to give the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ is reconcilable with
freedom of expression as protected by Article 10.
(iii) The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the
place of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the
decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not
mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State
exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has
to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole
and determine whether it was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and
whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are ‘relevant
and sufficient’ ... In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national
authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles
embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied on an acceptable assessment
of the relevant facts ...”
(ii) Debate in the field of politics
(α) Protection of political debate
146 . There is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for
restrictions on freedom of expression in the field of political speech (see
NIT S.R.L., cited above, § 178; Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC],
no. 26682/95, § 61, ECHR 1999‑IV; and Fleury v. France, no. 29784/06,
§ 43, 11 May 2010). The promotion of free political debate is a very
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