- 20
A
B
28.
-
Those principles were applied in subsequent cases while this
jurisprudence continued to develop. In Richards, Kerr LJ, after reviewing
A
B
the authorities including Bovis, expressed at [38] the broad test to be:
C
C
“that injunctions are only permissible if in particular
circumstances criminal proceedings are likely to prove
ineffective to achieve the public interest purposes for which
the legislation in question had been enacted.”
D
E
F
G
By asking if the public interest purposes of the legislation are effectively
achieved, the test has to some extent broadened the principles summarized
D
E
F
G
by Bingham LJ: see Hein, per Waller LJ at [75]. Waller LJ also observed
H
I
at [77] that Kerr LJ had cited with approval Millet J’s judgment in
Wychavon District Council v Midlands (Special Events) Ltd (1987) 86
H
I
LGR 83, at 87, that if a local council has good grounds for thinking that in
J
K
any given case compliance with the law will not be secured by prosecution,
it is entitled to apply for a quia timet injunction. That said, while the cases
J
K
since Bovis suggest a somewhat broader approach, the essential principles
L
M
N
O
remain those summarized by Bingham LJ: Shafi, per Sir Anthony Clarke
MR and Rix LJ at [33] - [36].
29.
preventive in nature.
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
In contrast to the criminal law, the injunction is essentially
30.
As Sir Martin Nourse in Hein, at [72], explained:
L
M
N
O
“As I see it, the real question is whether the civil court should
approach the matter on the basis that in this type of case it must
leave the matter to the criminal law, ie wait until an offence has
been committed, or whether, where it is obvious that a criminal
offence will be committed which will involve suffering or
serious disadvantage to those which the criminal law was
designed to protect, the civil court should grant relief,
preventing the criminal offence taking place.”
P
The categories of cases where an injunction in aid of the
T
criminal law may be granted are not closed. In Richards, Kerr LJ at [45]
Q
R
S
U
V