MAGYAR JETI ZRT v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT 15 question had been a technique of reporting that the press should remain free to opt for. Moreover, it had been established by the domestic courts that the journalist who had written the article including the hyperlink had acted in accordance with his professional obligations, among other things, by verifying the information available on YouTube. The applicant company also pointed out that Jobbik had had the option of bringing a claim against the author of the comments. Lastly, while providing access to the YouTube video through a hyperlink had not had a significant impact on Jobbik’s reputation, the domestic court judgment finding the applicant company liable for third-party statements had had far-reaching implications for the press when producing online journalistic content. Concerning this latter aspect, the applicant company noted that given the chilling effect caused by automatic liability for defamation based on the use of hyperlinks, journalists and online news portals would refrain from including hyperlinks in their publications, restricting the cross-referential structure of the Internet and users’ access to information. (b) The Government 44. The Government conceded that there had been an interference with the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression, albeit one prescribed by law and pursuing the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights of others. In their view, the authorities had also acted within their margin of appreciation. 45. Firstly, under Article 75 § 1 and Article 78 §§ 1 and 2 of the Civil Code, the statement or dissemination of an injurious falsehood concerning another person, or the presentation with untrue implications of a fact relating to another person, constituted defamation. Furthermore, the protection of the personality rights of others, that is to say the right to reputation, constituted a limit to the right to freedom of expression. 46. The Government were of the opinion that the court judgments against the applicant company could have been avoided had the applicant company acted with due care and had it not published the hyperlink leading to the video recording. The statement by J.Gy. had been expressed in definite terms and could not be viewed as an expression of an opinion but rather as a statement of fact. It had not reflected objective reality and had been capable of negatively affecting society’s opinion of the defendant, and irrespective of the applicant company’s good or bad faith, the dissemination of the statement had infringed the political party’s right to reputation. 47. The Government asserted that publishers of recordings should foresee that they would be held liable for content which they had failed to verify. Otherwise, serious human-rights violations could be committed without any sanctions. In their understanding, distribution of information meant transmitting or communicating information as thought which could infringe the rights of others even if the distributor did not agree with the content of the third-party statement or if he or she wrongfully relied on the veracity of the statement. Reiterating the arguments of the domestic courts, the Government emphasised that making unlawful content accessible in any