SAVVA TERENTYEV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 19 appreciation. However, the margin of appreciation is coupled with supervision by the Court both of the law and the decisions applying the law, even those given by independent courts. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (see, among many other authorities, Karataş v. Turkey [GC], no. 23168/94, § 48, ECHR 1999-IV). 64. The Court’s supervisory function is not limited to ascertaining whether the national authorities exercised their discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith. It has rather to examine the interference in the light of the case as a whole and to determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it were “relevant and sufficient” and whether the measure taken was “proportionate” to the legitimate aim pursued. In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities, basing themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts, applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 of the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Chauvy and Others v. France, no. 64915/01, § 70, ECHR 2004-VI). 65. With regard, more specifically, to the interference with freedom of expression in cases concerning expressions alleged to stir up or justify violence, hatred or intolerance, the Court reiterates that tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society. That being so, as a matter of principle it may be considered necessary in democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify violence or hatred based on intolerance provided that any “formalities”, “conditions”, “restrictions” or “penalties” imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, mutatis mutandis, Gündüz v. Turkey, no. 35071/97, § 40, ECHR 2003-XI). It certainly remains open to the relevant State authorities to adopt, in their capacity as guarantors of public order, measures, even of a criminal-law nature, intended to react appropriately and without excess to such remarks (see Erdoğdu, cited above, § 62). Moreover, where such remarks incite violence against an individual, a public official or a sector of the population, the State enjoys a wider margin of appreciation when examining the need for an interference with freedom of expression (see, among many other authorities, Öztürk, cited above, § 66; and Ceylan v. Turkey [GC], no. 23556/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-IV). 66. In its assessment of the interference with freedom of expression in cases concerning the expressions mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Court takes into account a number of factors, which have been summarised in the case of Perinçek (cited above, §§ 205-07). It is the interplay between the various factors rather than any of them taken in isolation that determines the outcome of a particular case (ibid., § 208). The Court will thus examine