SAVVA TERENTYEV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 25 public or influential figure (contrast, Osmani and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 50841/99, 11 October 2001, and Féret, cited above, §§ 75 and 76), which fact could have attracted public attention to his comment and thus have enhanced the potential impact of the impugned statements. In such circumstances the Court considers that the potential of the applicant’s comment to reach the public and thus to influence its opinion was very limited. 82. Turning to the reasoning of the domestic courts, the Court observes that they focused on the nature of the wording used by the applicant, limiting their findings to the form and tenor of the speech. They did not try to analyse the impugned statements in the context of the relevant discussion and to find out which idea they sought to impart. Whilst holding that that the applicant’s offence was particularly “blatant and dangerous for national security” as running against “the fundamentals of the constitutional system and State security”, the courts provided no explanation for the reasons for that conclusion. They made no attempt to assess the potential of the statements at hand to provoke any harmful consequences, with due regard to the political and social background, against which they were made, and to the scope of their reach. The Court thus finds that, in reaching their conclusions, the domestic courts failed to take account of all facts and relevant factors. Therefore the reasons cannot be regarded as “relevant and sufficient” to justify the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. 83. It further observes that the applicant was convicted in criminal proceedings and given a suspended sentence of one year’s imprisonment. The Court reiterates in this connection that a criminal conviction is a serious sanction, having regard to the existence of other means of intervention and rebuttal (see Perinçek, cited above, § 273). Moreover, although sentencing is in principle a matter for the national courts, the imposition of a prison sentence for an offence in the area of a debate on an issue of legitimate public interest will be compatible with freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention only in exceptional circumstances, notably where other fundamental rights have been seriously impaired, as, for example, in the case of hate speech or incitement to violence (see Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, no. 2034/07, §§ 59-60, ECHR 2011); the Court has already found (see paragraph 78 above) that the applicant’s text was not likely to encourage violence. 84. The Court has noted in paragraph 66 above that it is the interplay between the various factors rather than any of them taken in isolation that leads it to a conclusion that a particular statement constitutes an expression which cannot claim protection of Article 10. In the present case, although the wording of the impugned statements was, indeed, offensive, insulting and virulent (for which the applicant eventually apologised), they cannot be seen as stirring up base emotions or embedded prejudices in an attempt to