- 28 A B A 121. Mr Hughes submitted that the only instance of payment being B made to D2’s bank account in Hong Kong for jewellery purchases was C D because of allegations of unfair pressure and entrapment by the investigator as mentioned in Qian’s 2nd affirmation. These are disputed C D facts which cannot be resolved on affidavit evidence but should be E E resolved at trial. F F 122. G H There is sufficient evidence in my judgment showing that D2 was actively assisting D1 in the sale of jewellery by accepting payment into its bank account as evidenced by the payment made by the investigator into D2’s Hang Seng Bank account. I J G H Although D1 was incorporated on 18 March 2015, the evidence shows that as late as October 2015 D2 was actively involved in the jewellery business including I J receiving payment into its bank account as well as sharing managers, K K employees and premises, as submitted by Mr Clark. L L 123. M “… I use the words ‘common design’ because they are readily to hand but there are other expressions in the cases, such as ‘concerted action’ or ‘agreed on common action’ which will serve just as well. The words are not to be construed as if they formed part of a statute. They all convey the same idea. This idea does not, as it seems to me, call for any finding that the secondary party has explicitly mapped out a plan with the primary offender. Their tacit agreement will be sufficient. Nor, as it seems to me, is there any need for a common design to infringe. It is enough if the parties combine to secure the doing of acts which in the event prove to be infringements.” O P Q R T M when considering the question of common design: N S Mustill LJ said in Unilever v Gillette [1989] RPC 583 at p 609 124. D5 and D6 have also been sued as joint tortfeasors. D5 and D6 have not made affirmations but have authorized Qian to file his N O P Q R S T affirmations also on behalf of D5 and D6. U U V V