MADLANGA J something unknown. So, we must approach the definition of “designated Judge” in RICA with this awareness in mind and be wary not instinctively to reject the notion that a definition section may well be a power-conferring provision. Of course, RICA is a different statute and it must be its own interpretation that yields a determination that the power to designate exists or does not. My reliance on section 1 of PAJA does not, in the least, mean I am not alive to this. What I seek to point out is that it is not unheard of that a power to do something may be implied from the definition section. [76] Reverting to RICA, the definition of “designated Judge” refers to a Judge falling within one of the two identified categories and “who is designated by the Minister to perform the functions of a designated Judge for purposes of [RICA]”. The definition tells us what the functions of the designated Judge are; they are to be found in RICA. And they have largely been identified above. So, we know who qualifies to be a designated Judge. We know what a designated Judge is required to do. What remains is the formal act of designating, which – in essence – need not entail more than to identify a Judge falling within the two identified categories and advising her or him that she or he has been so identified “to perform the functions of a designated Judge for purposes of [RICA]”. Why then can’t the Minister designate? Reading the definition and the provisions on the functions of a designated Judge together and taking into account the fact that the act of designating need not go beyond what I have just identified, it would be the height of formalism to insist that the power to designate must be expressly provided in the substantive provisions of RICA. Yes, a substantive provision conferring the power would have been a “nice-to-have”, but I do not agree that its absence must legally result in a lack of power. Crucially, the many provisions on the functions of a designated Judge appear to proceed from the premise that the power to designate a Judge does exist in RICA. These provisions must have been meant to be operable based on the definition of “designated Judge” in section 1. To suggest otherwise would be to place form ahead of substance. The conclusion has to be that the power to designate a Judge is implicit in a proper conjoined reading of the definition of “designated Judge” and other provisions of RICA. 44