contents of the responses speak for themselves, and if necessary, the court can take into account such responses and makes the same conclusion that the Defendant’s act was one which outrages public decency. Verdict 36. In reaching the verdict, I have reminded myself not to pass any personal moral judgment on the Defendant’s conduct, nor to take into account any policy consideration as to whether the Defendant’s conduct is desirable in modern world. I am not sitting as a judge of taste, and doing something disgraceful or immoral per se is not a criminal offence. It is also not the court’s role to create new offences, as it is a matter for the legislature. On the other hand, committing an act outraging public decency is a long-established offence in common law. Although the values of society may change from time to time, the object of the offence in preventing the corruption of mind and the destruction or erosion of values of decency is still valid in modern world. Further, like other media such as newspapers and books, internet is a public forum and so there is no reason why the offence is not applicable to messages published on the internet. 37. Hence, in my judgment, the correct approach is for the court to apply faithfully the established legal principles to perhaps the novel facts of the present case, which is role of the court according to the well-quoted observations of Parke B. in Mirehouse v Rennell (1833) 1 Cl. & F 527 (cited with approval by Lord Simon in Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. v DPP, ibid. at p. 492), 16