otherwise and assert that the Ordinance has extra-territorial effect such that the Respondent has power to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance who does not situates and controls the use of data in Hong Kong. His main reason was that the purpose of the Ordinance, as stated in chapter 17 of the LRC Report, is validated by section 33 of the Ordinance, which gives rise to the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Ordinance. 56. The wordings used in chapter 17 of the LRC Report and section 33 " of the Ordinance are not identical. Chapter 17 provides for processing of " personal data in Hong Kong , whereas section 33(l)(a) provides for " personal data the collection, holding, processing or use of which takes " place in Hong Kong (emphasis added). Chapter 17 provides for "data processing outside Hong Kong which is controlled from within the territorywhereas section 33(l)(b) provides for "personal data the collection, holdins, processing or use ofwhich is controlled by a data user " whose principal place of business is in Hong Kong (emphasis added). 57. Furthermore, the contexts of chapter 17 of the LRC Report and section 33 of the Ordinance are different. Section 33 deals with theÿspecific transfer of specified data out of Hong Kong, and not general matters of use or control of any data in Hong Kong. In the above different contexts one can easily understand that in section 33 references will be made to persons outside of Hong Kong. Such references do not render any assistance to the Appellant in his argument of extra-territorial effect of the Ordinance, which is a much wider context. 58. The Appellant also relied heavily on some wordings in chapter 17 of the LRC Report, for example, "Hong Kong's data protection law" and 47