Price v. City of N.Y. 41 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 25, 2018) S. Ct. at 2023. The Second Circuit has followed suit. See, e.g., McGowan v. United States, 825 F.3d 118, 122-25 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that appellate cases "establishing the right of a prisoner to be free from retaliation for filing a lawsuit or grievance" did not clearly establish the unlawfulness of retaliating against a prisoner for authoring an article, under his own byline, that was critical of prison policies). from the official Twitter accounts because Here, neither the parties nor the Court has "identified any binding authority in existence at the relevant time that . . . 'directly address[ed]' the reasonableness of the challenged conduct," see McGowan, 825 F.3d at 124 (quoting Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2014)), particularly in the *41 context of First Amendment claims concerning the government's use of social media. Nor have decisions from other circuits "clearly foreshadow[ed] a particular ruling on the issue." Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2010); see also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (requiring, in the absence of controlling authority, "a robust 'consensus of cases of persuasive authority'" (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999))).17 After careful consideration, the Court Cir. 2016). concludes that it must grant qualified immunity to Brooks and Obe on the individual-capacity claims against them. 17 In Hope, the Supreme Court appeared to hold that the law could be clearly established by state regulations and guidance from the U.S. Department of Justice concerning the challenged conduct. 536 U.S. at 741-42. In this case, Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he City Social Media Policy provides that a comment may be deleted if it violates the comment policy" and that the policy dictates that "people are not to be blocked on Social Media based on viewpoint." (FAC ¶¶ 94, 138). If Hope were the last word on qualified immunity, which it is not, the Court might be inclined to conclude that the City's Social Media Policy provided fair warning to Brooks and Obe that their conduct — blocking Plaintiff of her viewpoint — was unlawful, and therefore deny them qualified immunity. But the Court does not conclude as such because Hope's holding has been cabined to "obvious" cases, see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam), and because the influence of Hope is at a low ebb, see, e.g., McGowan v. United States, 825 F.3d 118, 122-25 (2d 42 Turning to the individual-capacity claim against Pierre-Louis, the parties vigorously dispute whether Pierre-Louis acted under color of law when she blocked Plaintiff from the @RPLNYC Twitter account. But the Court need not resolve this dispute. Even if Pierre-Louis did act under color of law, she would be entitled to qualified immunity because at the time of the challenged conduct, there was neither binding authority nor "a robust 'consensus of cases of persuasive authority'" holding that her conduct was unlawful. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617). The Court therefore grants *42 qualified immunity to Pierre-Louis on the individual-capacity claims against her. The Court next considers whether the City of New York, through its policies, practices, or widespread customs, caused the violation of Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment. See Askins v. Doe, 727 F.3d 248, 254-55 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that qualified immunity is a defense available only to individuals sued in their individual capacities; municipalities have no immunity from damages for liability flowing from their constitutional violations).18 Plaintiff does not appear to allege that the City had an official policy of blocking commenters on social media because of their viewpoint. Rather, she alleges that the City's official policy was that its social media moderators — such as Brooks and Obe — may not block commenters based upon their expressed viewpoint. (FAC ¶ 138). Stated another way, she has not alleged that an official City policy caused 20