with allegations of fact that inferences cannot be distinguished from facts. Any at discerning the perception of the reasonable viewer or reader. The chambers judge cursorily examined this issue. He concluded that the impugned statements could not be distinguished from those in WIC Radio v. Simpson, 2008 SCC 40, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420, which were found to be comments. Characterizing speech as a comment or as a statement of fact involves a contextual analysis, the result of which is at most a finding of mixed law and fact. Transposing a finding of mixed law and fact to another case is a questionable practice that should be avoided. In the instant case, there are grounds to believe that the fair comment defence is not available for two of H’s statements because they were made as statements of fact and not comments. Those statements carry the defamatory sting that N engaged in hate speech. Affirming that N engaged in hate speech is quite different from expressing a judgment or making a remark incapable of proof. Read in their context, such allegations appear similar to allegations of fraud, theft or other criminal conduct that have been found to be statements of fact for which a fair comment defence is not available. At the public interest hurdle under s. 4(2)(b) of the PPPA, what is required of a plaintiff is not to prove harm or causation but only to provide evidence for the judge to draw an inference of likelihood in respect of the existence of the harm and the relevant causal link. The seriousness of the harm can be inferred from the gravity of 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) ambiguity in this regard must benefit the plaintiff. The inquiry is an objective one aimed