JAFTA J confers such power on the Minister whilst the first judgment holds that it does.183 This has a bearing on the order proposed in the first judgment, to the extent that it defines the functions to be performed by a designated Judge. Power to designate [159] There is no provision in the entire RICA which expressly empowers the Minister to designate a Judge for the purposes of determining applications for authorisation to intercept private communications and also perform other functions. There is none at all. The first judgment concludes that the power is conferred by section 1 of RICA. I am not convinced. [160] Section 1 is an interpretation provision which tells us the meaning to be assigned to certain words as they appear in the body of RICA. The heading to section 1 is “definitions and interpretation”. This makes it plain that this provision’s purpose is to help in the interpretation of words employed in the Act. Where Parliament in an Act uses words in a sense other than their ordinary meaning, Parliament includes a definition provision like section 1 of RICA. In that provision, Parliament defines the meaning of each word it wishes should carry a special meaning. [161] It is an established principle of our law that words defined in a statute must be given their defined meaning whenever they appear in the statute unless doing so would lead to an injustice or absurdity not intended by Parliament184. In Moosa the Appellate Division held in 1929: “An interpretation clause has its uses, but it also has its dangers, as it is obvious from the present case. To adhere to the definition regardless of subject-matter and context 183 First judgment at [79]. 184 SATAWU v Garvas [2012] ZACC 13; 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC); 2012 (8) BCLR 840 (CC) at para 37; S v Zuma [1995] ZACC 1; 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC); 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC) at paras 13-4; and Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 543. 82