30 City of Fort Pierce v. FERC, 730 F.2d 778, 785-86 (D.C. Cir. 1984). I note that the ban here is simply on differences in rates, an issue normally addressed under statutory language barring discrimination. So it is at least anomalous that the Commission here relies on § 201(b), which says nothing about discrimination, rather than § 202(a), which does. The only reason I can discern is that the Commission’s interpretation of § 202 was more clearly established, and obviously didn’t ban reasonable discriminations. Accordingly, the Commission jumped over to § 201(b), about which it had said relatively little. In the passage where the Order claims support from § 201(b), the Commission appears to acknowledge that it has never interpreted that section to support a sweeping ban on quality-of-service premiums, but, speaking of its antidiscrimination decisions (evidently under both §§ 201(b) and 202(a)), it says that “none of those precedents involved practices that the Commission has twice found threaten to create barriers to broadband development that should be removed under section 706.” Order ¶ 292. This is an odd form of statutory interpretation. Finessing any effort to fit the agency action within the statutory language, it only claims that the banned practice threatens broadband deployment. Maybe the theory works, but it can do so only by a sturdy showing of how the banned conduct posed a “threat.” As we’ll see, the Commission has made no such showing, let alone a sturdy one. Indeed, I can find no indication—and the Commission presents none—that any of the agencies regulating natural monopolies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or Federal Communications Commission—has ever attempted to use its