Page: 13 documents, nor was there any basis for finding that the Ministry had a property right in them. [47] The factual background in Walmsley is quite different from the situation in this case. The City in this case has some limited control over the documents in the sense that it can dictate what can be created or stored on its server. However, this is merely a prohibition power, not a creation power. The City can prohibit employees from certain uses, but does not control what employees create, how or if they store it on the server, and what they choose to do with their own material after that, including the right to destroy it if they wish. Just as in Walmsley, when considered against the intent and purpose of the legislation, it cannot have been intended that the mere use of the email server for personal purposes results in employees being bound by the recordkeeping obligation of the Act in respect of their personal correspondence and documents. [48] A useful test for determining “control” was suggested by the court in Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence)17. The issue was whether documents in the possession of the Prime Minister and certain Ministers could be said to be within the control of the government institutions to which they were connected and which were subject to federal freedom of information legislation. The Federal Court of Appeal imposed a two part test for determining whether such a document could be said to be within the control of the government institution: (i) whether the contents of the document relate to a departmental matter; and (2) whether the relevant government institution could reasonably expect to obtain a copy of the document upon request. The Court held that the document would only be in the control of the government institution if the answer to both questions is yes. Applying those same questions in this case would result in a finding that Mr. O’Connor’s correspondence with CAS would not be in the control of the City of Ottawa because: (1) the contents do not relate to a City matter; and (2) the City could not expect to be given such documents merely by requesting them because they did not fall within the scope of Mr. O’Connor’s employment. [49] In Order P-1069 dated November 30, 1995, the IPC held that CAS records are not subject to FIPPA merely because the Ministry of Community and Social Services has a general supervisory and monitoring role over the CAS. In coming to that conclusion, the Adjudicator relied on the fact that the Ministry’s right of access to CAS records was limited to requiring financial accountability and periodic administrative reviews to ensure compliance with the Child and Family Services Act. There is a direct parallel between that case and this one. In the case before us the City has a right to monitor and supervise the use of its email server to ensure compliance with policies. However, that is also a limited right of access. Applying the same reasoning as in Order P-1069, CAS records should not be subject to the Act merely because they have been sent to an individual who has stored them on an electronic data base subject to monitoring by the City to ensure compliance with its own policies. [50] The case closest on its facts to the case before this Court is also an IPC decision, Order PO-1947-F dated September 13, 2001, a decision of Arbitrator Liang. At issue were records that had 17 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2008 FC 766 (T.D.), aff’d. 2009 FCA 175 at para. 8.