Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 BARRETT, J., concurring a particular point of view”? Hurley, 515 U. S., at 575. In other words, technology may attenuate the connection between content-moderation actions (e.g., removing posts) and human beings’ constitutionally protected right to “decide for [themselves] the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 641 (1994) (emphasis added). So the way platforms use this sort of technology might have constitutional significance. There can be other complexities too. For example, the corporate structure and ownership of some platforms may be relevant to the constitutional analysis. A speaker’s right to “decide ‘what not to say’ ” is “enjoyed by business corporations generally.” Hurley, 515 U. S., at 573–574 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1, 16 (1986)). Corporations, which are composed of human beings with First Amendment rights, possess First Amendment rights themselves. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 365 (2010); cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 706–707 (2014). But foreign persons and corporations located abroad do not. Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc., 591 U. S. 430, 433–436 (2020). So a social-media platform’s foreign ownership and control over its contentmoderation decisions might affect whether laws overriding those decisions trigger First Amendment scrutiny. What if the platform’s corporate leadership abroad makes the policy decisions about the viewpoints and content the platform will disseminate? Would it matter that the corporation employs Americans to develop and implement contentmoderation algorithms if they do so at the direction of foreign executives? Courts may need to confront such questions when applying the First Amendment to certain platforms. These are just a few examples of questions that might