Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 5 THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment challenges creates practical concerns as well. Facial challenges’ dubious historical roots further confirm that the doctrine should have no place in our jurisprudence. A 1 Article III empowers federal courts to exercise “judicial Power” only over “Cases” and “Controversies.” This Court has long recognized that those terms impose substantive constraints on the authority of federal courts. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 356–358 (1911); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102 (1998). One corollary of the case-or-controversy requirement is that while federal courts can judge the constitutionality of statutes, they may do so only to the extent necessary to resolve the case at hand. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” but only because “[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803); see Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885) (“[The Court] has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute . . . irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies”). Accordingly, “[e]xcept when necessary” to resolve a case or controversy, “courts have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive action.” Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 492 (2009); see United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 20–21 (1960). These limitations on the power of judicial review play an essential role in preserving our constitutional structure. Our Constitution sets forth a “tripartite allocation of power,” separating different types of powers across three coequal branches. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 341 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[E]ach