Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 13 THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment even simple fact patterns, a court has little chance of determining whether a novel, never-before-enforced state law can be constitutionally enforced against nonparties without resorting to mere speculation. For cases such as these, where the constitutional analysis depends on complex, factspecific questions, the task becomes impossible. D Facial challenges are particularly suspect given their origins. They appear to be the product of two doctrines that are themselves constitutionally questionable, vagueness and overbreadth. At the time of the founding, it was well understood that federal courts could hold a statute unconstitutional only insofar as necessary to resolve a particular case or controversy. See supra, at 5–6. The Founders were certainly familiar with alternative systems that provided for the freefloating review of duly enacted statutes. For example, the New York Constitution of 1777 created a Council of Revision, composed of the Governor, Chancellor, and New York Supreme Court. See Hansen, 599 U. S., at 786 (THOMAS, J., concurring). The Council of Revision could object to “any measure of a [prospective] bill” based on “not only [its] constitutionality . . . but also [its] policy.” Id., at 787. If the Council lodged an objection, the Legislature’s only options were to “conform to [the Council’s] objections, override them by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, or simply let the bill die.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). In our Constitution, the Founders refused to create a council of revision or involve the Federal Judiciary in the business of reviewing statutes in the abstract. “Despite the support of respected delegates . . . the Convention voted against creating a federal council of revision on four different occasions. No other proposal was considered and rejected so many times.” Id., at 789 (citation omitted). Instead, the Founders created a Judiciary with “only the