Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008). But it seems to me that it should matter. The Supreme Court has rightly pointed out that the presumption against extraterritoriality is more than simply a means for avoiding conflict with foreign laws. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255. At the same time, the presumption that Congress legislates with domestic concerns pre-eminent in its collective mind does not fully answer the question what those domestic concerns are in any given case. See id. at 266. Particularly in connection with statutes that provide tools to law enforcement, one imagines that Congress is concerned with balancing liberty interests of various kinds against the need to enforce domestic law. Thus, when Congress authorizes the (American) government to obtain access to certain information, one might imagine that its focus is on balancing the liberty interests of Americans (and of other persons residing in the U.S.) against the need to enforce American laws. Congress might also reasonably be concerned about the diplomatic consequences of over-extending the reach of American law enforcement officials. This suggests a more complex balancing exercise than identifying a single “focus” of the legislation, the latter approach being better suited to determining whether given conduct fitting within the literal words of a prohibition should be characterized as domestic or extraterritorial.7 7 While, for these reasons, it may be impossible to answer satisfactorily the question what the single focus of the SCA is, I note that I have considerable doubts about the answer supplied by the Court, which holds that the SCA provisions at issue here “focus on protecting the privacy of the content of a user’s stored electronic communications.” Majority Op. at 33. Privacy, however, is an abstract concept with no obvious territorial locus; the conclusion that the SCA’s focus is privacy thus does not really help us to distinguish domestic applications of the statute from extraterritorial ones. “The real motor of the Court’s opinion,” Morrison, 561 U.S. at 284 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), then, is less the conclusion that the statute focuses on privacy than the majority’s further determination that the locus of the invasion of privacy is where the private content is stored – a determination that seems to me suspect when the content consists of emails stored in the “cloud.” It seems at least equally persuasive that the invasion of privacy occurs where the person whose privacy is invaded customarily resides. 14