KABLIS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 21 date. Secondly, its scope was limited to examining the lawfulness of the proposal to change the event’s location, time or manner of conduct, and did not include any assessment of its “necessity in a democratic society” and “proportionality”. 68. The Court notes that, since the facts prompting the applications joined in Lashmankin and Others arose, a new Code of Administrative Procedure (“the CAP”) reforming the applicable judicial review procedures entered into force on 15 September 2015. It provides, in particular, that complaints against the authorities’ decisions concerning changes to a public event’s purposes, location, type or the manner of conducting it are to be examined by a district court, and if possible any appeal is also to be examined, before the planned date of the event. If the court allows the complaint, it requires the authority or official to remedy the breach of the complainant’s rights – in particular by determining the specific steps which need to be taken – and sets out a time-limit. The judicial decision is subject to immediate enforcement (see a summary of the domestic law provisions in Lashmankin and Others, cited above, §§ 289-94 and 297). The Court considers that those developments in the domestic law have corrected the first defect identified in Alekseyev (cited above) and Lashmankin and Others, by henceforth allowing an enforceable judicial decision to be obtained on the authorities’ refusal to approve a public event’s location, time or the manner in which it is to be conducted before its planned date. 69. As regards the second defect, the Court notes that the CAP reproduces in substance the legal provisions on the scope of judicial review examined and found deficient in Lashmankin and Others. The CAP provides that the lawfulness of the contested decision or act – understood in the sense of compliance with the rules of competence, procedure and contents – remains the sole relevant issue examined on judicial review (see a summary of the domestic law provisions in Lashmankin and Others, cited above, §§ 295-96). It follows that the second defect identified in Lashmankin and Others has not been corrected by the CAP. Indeed, in the present case the domestic courts did not strike a fair balance between private and public interests, holding that the applicant had no right to choose the location of a public event and that the proposal to change the location had not therefore restricted his right to freedom of assembly. That finding is in clear contradiction with the standards established by the Court under Article 11 (see Lashmankin and Others, cited above, §§ 405-08). 70. The Court takes note of the Supreme Court’s Ruling of 26 June 2018, instructing the domestic courts that when examining under the CAP complaints against the authorities’ decisions concerning changes to a public event’s purposes, location, type or the manner in which it was to be conducted, they had to assess whether the interference by a public authority with the right to freedom of public assembly had been lawful, necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim, and in particular whether the reasons for