28 KABLIS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 93. In this connection the Court takes note of the applicant’s argument that the term “public events held in breach of the established procedure” in section 15.3 of the Information Act is too broad and vague. Indeed, in the absence of any authoritative interpretation of that term by the Supreme or Constitutional Courts, and taking into account that the Government have not submitted any examples of its restrictive interpretation and application in administrative and judicial practice, it appears that any breach of the procedure for the conduct of public events, no matter how small or innocuous, may serve as a ground for the Prosecutor General’s decision to block access to Internet posts containing calls to participate in that event. Access to such posts can therefore be blocked by a prosecutor, as in the present case, for the sole reason that it calls for participation in a public event at a location that has not been approved by the authorities, without having to establish a risk of disorder or of any real nuisance to the rights of others. 94. The Court further notes that the Prosecutor General and his deputies may order the blocking of an entire website or webpage – for example an entire social networking account, as in the present case – on the grounds that it contains some illegal material. Section 15.3 of the Information Act does not require them to examine whether the wholesale blocking of the entire website or webpage, rather than of a specific information item published on it, is necessary, having regard to the criteria established and applied by the Court under Article 10 of the Convention. Such an obligation, however, flows directly from the Convention and from the case-law of the Convention institutions. In particular, Article 10 requires the authorities to take into consideration, among other aspects, the fact that such a measure, by rendering large quantities of information inaccessible, is bound to substantially restrict the rights of Internet users and to have a significant collateral effect on the material that has not been found to be illegal (see Ahmet Yıldırım, cited above, § 66, and Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, § 64, ECHR 2015 (extracts)). There is no evidence in the domestic decisions in the present case that those factors were taken into consideration when the applicant’s entire VKontakte account was blocked on the grounds that it contained one illegal information item. 95. It follows that the applicable legal framework affords the Prosecutor General and his deputies very wide powers to apply prior restraint measures to Internet posts containing calls to participate in public events, both as regards the grounds for ordering the blocking measure and as regards its scope. 96. The Court notes that the exercise of the Prosecutor General’s powers to block Internet posts containing calls to participate in public events is subject to judicial review. However, the breadth of the executive’s discretion is such that it is likely to be difficult, if not impossible, to