information an individual would wish to keep confidential, such as his or her medical history, sexual orientation, or family matters. Some may argue that, to guard against this danger, the Court can render a decision of partial unconstitutionality; that the word “facts” in the Provision at Issue violates the Constitution to the extent that it includes “facts that do not amount to secrecy of private life,” and can thereby harmonize the protection of secrecy of private life and the guarantee of freedom of expression. This view suggests that issuing such decision would guarantee secrecy and freedom of private life by leaving intact an element in the Provision at Issue which is the alleging of “facts that amount to secrecy of private life,” and would simultaneously minimize restrictions on freedom of expression by excluding the alleging of “facts that do not amount to secrecy of private life” from the elements in the Provision at Issue. The view supporting the partial unconstitutionality decision notes that, because “if solely concerned with the public interest” in Article 310 of the Criminal Act is overly broad and vague, an individual intending to allege facts cannot predict in advance whether his or her statement will fall within the ground for justification. For the individual who can foresee that his or her expressive activity will establish the elements in the Provision at Issue, but cannot foresee whether unlawfulness will be justified under Article 310 of the Criminal Act, this individual would forego alleging facts necessary for society, considering the possibility of criminal sanctions based on the Provision at Issue, and the ensuing chilling effect. In this regard, the view supporting the partial unconstitutionality decision opines that, to resolve the problem of unpredictability at the stage of justification for unlawfulness, the element of “alleging facts that do not amount to secrecy of private life” should be excluded at the stage of establishment of elements. Nonetheless, it is likewise difficult to clearly determine what constitutes “facts that amount to secrecy of private life,” because there - 12 -