be fully and easily restored once harmed. Because the Provision at Issue, by prohibiting factual defamation, serves the goal of protecting the reputation of individuals, i.e. their right to personality, the Court recognizes the legitimacy of this legislative purpose. Additionally, because inflicting criminal sanctions on a person who violates the abovementioned prohibition may have a considerable deterrent effect on defamatory expression, the Court also recognizes the appropriateness of this means. 2. Least Restrictive Means (a) Since reputation is a basic condition for an individual’s development and expression of his or her personality, the protection of reputation contributes not only to the free development of personality and the safeguarding of human dignity but also to the realization of democracy. If reputation is not properly protected, it can be burdensome for individuals to openly voice an opinion different from that of the majority, and freedom of expression is more likely to be stifled. Therefore, the precedence between freedom of expression and the right to personality is not a matter that can be determined easily (see Constitutional Court 2009Hun-Ma747, December 26, 2013). Since the characteristic nature of the reputation of an individual is that it is difficult to be fully restored once harmed, there is a risk that, as long as made publicly, defamatory expression will render an individual’s personality devoid of value and unlikely to be restored. Further, in our society, which places importance on reputation and public image, defamatory expression has serious social consequences, such as cases where the defamed makes the extreme choice of suicide. Therefore, while the Court recognizes a need to guarantee freedom of expression, it cannot be disregarded, given the legally protected interest of personal reputation and the unique nature of our society, that there is also the need for the protection of the right to personality by regulating factual - 6 -