RUBINS v. LATVIA JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION 25 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES MAHONEY AND WOJTYCZEK 1. We have been unable to agree with our colleagues that the applicant has been the victim of an unjustified interference with his freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 of the Convention. In our view, the facts of the present case present the characteristics of a classic employment dispute and, in so far as any issue of freedom of expression arose, it was adequately dealt with by the national courts for the purposes of Article 10 of the Convention. As far as we are concerned, the applicant has not produced to this Court any grounds for arriving at a conclusion other than the one arrived at by the national courts. A. Paragraph 1 of Article 10: Existence of an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression 2. When considering cases concerning freedom of expression in the context labour relations it is necessary to distinguish two main types of situations. In the first one, an employee expresses - in public or in private - views on questions of public interest, which may or may not be related to his or her employer. The employer imposes on the employee a sanction for the views expressed. In the second one, an employee communicates to the employer his or her views concerning matters directly related to his or her employment in order to influence the employer’s attitude and to shape the relations between the two parties. The employee’s utterances are an integral part of interactions between two parties within the framework of a labour relationship. The employer reacts to what it considers to be misconduct in these interactions. The two situations require a different approach as the legally protected values and interests at stake are different. As we explain below, the instant case belongs to the second type of situations. 3. The majority of our colleagues assert that “the allegedly unethical manner of expression used by the applicant in communication with his employer” constituted “the crux of the employment dispute” (paragraph 45 in fine of the present judgment – emphasis supplied). It is this conception of “the central issue in the dispute” and of “the nature of the dispute in question” that prompts the majority to hold that the applicant’s dismissal from his post amounted to an interference with the exercise by him of his freedom of expression (paragraphs 47 and 70 of the present judgment). 4. In our view, however, the applicant’s e-mail of 10 March 2010 to the Rector of the University, the ensuing notice of termination of employment sent to the applicant by the University and the subsequent decisions of the national courts tell a somewhat different story.