MR JUSTICE WARBY Approved Judgment 81. NT1 & NT2 v Google LLC First, there is data protection law itself. DPA s 70(2) contains a “supplementary definition” which explains that “For the purposes of this Act, data are inaccurate if they are incorrect or misleading as to any matter of fact.” This does not take the matter much further, though the reference to fact emphasises that this Principle is not concerned with matters of comment, opinion or evaluation. The reference to “misleading” indicates that the Court should not adopt too narrow and literal an approach. The Working Party’s comments on its criterion 4 are helpful: “In general, ‘accurate’ means accurate as to a matter of fact. There is a difference between a search result that clearly relates to one person’s opinion of another person and one that appears to contain factual information. In data protection law the concepts of accuracy, adequacy and incompleteness are closely related. DPAs will be more likely to consider that de-listing of a search result is appropriate where there is inaccuracy as to a matter of fact and where this presents an inaccurate, inadequate or misleading impression of an individual. When a data subject objects to a search result on the grounds that it is inaccurate, the DPAs can deal with such a request if the complainant provides all the information needed to establish the data are evidently inaccurate.” 82. A second source of possible guidance is the domestic law of defamation. Although the DP Directive must be given an autonomous interpretation, it may be legitimate to draw on national legal traditions when implementing the broad principles established by European law. In a libel action, where truth is in issue, the Court will first determine the single natural and ordinary meaning which the words complained of would convey to the ordinary reasonable reader. It is that which the defendant must then prove to be true. A claim for libel cannot be founded on a headline or other matter, read in isolation from the related text; the Court must identify the single meaning of a publication by reference to the response of the ordinary reader to the entire publication: Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65. Mr Tomlinson initially submitted that the position is or should be different in the present context. Unlike the position in a libel case, he argued, the court looks not at the “natural and ordinary meaning” of the article read as a whole, but at each discrete “item of information” which it contains. Mr White contends that any factual statement contained in the Articles or the Book Extract must be read in its proper context, and that any complaint of inaccuracy must be assessed in the light of the ordinary and natural meaning of the Article or Book Extract of which the offending statement is part. 83. By the end of the trial, Mr Tomlinson had moved in this direction, accepting that words must be read and interpreted in context, but he still resisted the introduction of the defamation principles as to meaning, suggesting that they contained “artificial” restrictions. As I have indicated, I prefer Mr White’s submissions. I do not regard the principles identified in Charleston as artificial. Nor do I think them inapposite in the present context. They have been developed over centuries to meet the needs of a cause of action that addresses issues arising from the publication of words and their impact on reputation. Mr White’s submissions also have two other virtues. They find support in domestic authority. In Lord Ashcroft v Attorney-General [2002] EWHC