phone number, or URL is instead part of the substantive information conveyed to the recipient, then by definition it is “content.” The different ways that an address can be used means, as Professor Orin Kerr puts it, that “the line between contents and metadata is not abstract but contextual with respect to each communication.”38 Thus, there is no general answer to the question of whether locational information is content. Rather, a “content” inquiry is a case-specific one turning on the role the location identifier played in the “intercepted” communication. Here, the complaint does not make clear whether the tracked URLs were acquired by the defendants from communications in which those URLs played a routing function. This is not, however, fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim. In a declassified opinion analyzing whether there was statutory authority for a National Security Agency surveillance program, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court observed that the government possessed trap and trace authority over “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information . . . provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any information.”39 The 38 Kerr, Websurfing and the Wiretap Act. 39 [Redacted], No. PR/TT [Redacted] (FISA Ct. 2010), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%2 02.pdf at 26 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4)). 21