defendants’ counsel acknowledged as much at argument.51 Because the complaint pleads a broad scheme in which the defendants generally acquired and tracked the plaintiffs’ internet usage, we are satisfied that this scheme, if it operated as alleged, involved the collection of at least some “content” within the meaning of the Wiretap Act.52 The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 2136 (“Perhaps because it is so intuitive that search terms in a URL should be considered content, the treatment of content-revealing communications data is undertheorized in computer surveillance scholarship.”). 51 Oral Arg. Tr. at 44 (“We acknowledge that there may be URLs that could constitute content.”). 52 Because the URL information acquired and tracked by the defendants is “content” for purposes of the plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim, we need not consider whether the defendants acquired and/or tracked other “content” from the electronic transmissions at issue. Our understanding of the factual position of the defendants is that their cookies operate by adding a unique sequence of letters and/or numbers to any GET request transmitted from the user browser hosting the cookie to the advertiser server that set the cookie. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 25 (“The cookie doesn’t acquire anything. . . . The cookie doesn’t look for anything. It just sits on the browser and gets sent along with information that would otherwise be sent.”); id. at 26 (“Maybe it’s sort of like a bookmark. Information gets sent anyway every day, all the time. And then a cookie is placed. And thereafter the same information is sent, except that the cookie is there, too. It’s unique. It’s not personally identifying. It has nothing to do with the actual 27