judgment on grounds other than those considered by the district court itself.73 Second, the plaintiffs argue that the party exception should not apply for equitable reasons, in that the transmitted GET requests included cookie information that the communications included only because of the defendants’ surreptitious circumvention of the cookie blockers. The point here is that, though the plaintiffs sent the GET requests to the defendants voluntarily, they were induced to do so by deceit. Though we are no doubt troubled by the various deceits alleged in the complaint, we do not agree that a deceit upon the sender affects the presumptive non-liability of parties under § 2511(2)(d). “In the context of the statute, a party to the conversation is one who takes part in the conversation.”74 There is no statutory language indicating this excludes intended recipients who procured their entrance to a conversation through a fraud in the inducement, such as, here, 73 See Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 4746391, at *8 (3d Cir. Aug. 12, 2015). 74 Caro v. Weintraub, 618 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964) (“[I]mpersonation of the intended receiver is not an interception within the meaning of the statute.”); Clemons v. Waller, 82 Fed. App’x 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2003) (“By citing Pasha, Congress strongly intimated that one who impersonates the intended receiver of a communication may still be a party to that communication for the purposes of the federal wiretap statute and that such conduct is not proscribed by the statute.”). 36