Paragraph 2(c) provides that it shall not be unlawful for a party to any wire or oral communication . . . to intercept such communication. It largely reflects existing law. Where one of the parties consents, it is not unlawful. . . . “[P]arty” would mean the person actually participating in the communication. (United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964)).78 We agree with the Sixth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit that, “[b]y citing Pasha, Congress strongly intimated that one who impersonates the intended receiver of a communication may still be a party to that communication for the purposes of the federal wiretap statute and that such conduct is not proscribed by the statute.”79 Likewise, we conclude it was by design that there is no statutory language by which the defendants’ various alleged deceits would vitiate their claims to be parties 78 Clemons v. Waller, 82 Fed. App’x 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 93-94 (1968)); see also United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979) (“It is clear from this passage that Congress intended to reaffirm the result in Pasha and make admissible communications to which a police officer is a party.”). 79 Clemons, 82 Fed. App’x at 442; accord Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 863. 38