5 arbitrary, unreasonable, and undermines the concept of separation of powers. D. The present legal framework governing electronic surveillance fails the test of proportionality, inasmuch as the provisions (viz., Section 69 and 2009 IT Rules) are open-ended and vague, creating a chilling effect on free expression of citizens. Most of the grounds specified under Section 69(1) to carry out electronic surveillance are a verbatim reproduction of restrictions contained in Article 19(2). Consequently, the Executive has an unguided discretion to justify electronic surveillance. Notably, the provision also encompasses circumstances relating to “defence of India,” although such an expression is neither defined under the IT Act nor recognised under Article 19(2). Egregiously, the provision enables the State to conduct perpetual, untargeted, and mass surveillance of her citizens, under a pretext for “investigation of any offence”. E. While secrecy may be an inherent trait, and even the paramount objective for carrying out electronic surveillance, the IT Act and 2009 Rules have, while excessively delegating to the Executive, failed to instil adequate safeguards to prevent abusive, excessive, and arbitrary exercise of its powers. In particular, the “necessary or expedient” standard adopted under subclause (1) of Section 69 to authorise electronic surveillance woefully falls short of “the test of proportionality” - a sine-qua-non to curtail fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21.