Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Miranda v SSHD Schedule 7 power is not compatible with article 10 of the Convention because it is not “prescribed by law” as required by article 10(2). 24. The fact that the material was said to be journalistic material lies at the heart of the third, fourth and fifth grounds of appeal. It is the reason why the Interveners sought and were granted permission to intervene in the proceedings. THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS OF APPEAL What was the purpose of the stop? 25. It seems to me to be logical to start with the question of what the purpose of the stop was before deciding whether a stop conducted for that purpose was permitted by Schedule 7. 26. Laws LJ considered the purpose for which the Schedule 7 power was used at paras 17 to 27 of his judgment. He said that this was a question of fact. That is plainly right. He also said that, where there is or may be more than one purpose, the correct test is to determine the “true and dominant” purpose, even though some secondary or incidental advantage may be gained for some purpose which is outside the authorised purpose: see R v Southwark Crown Court, ex p Bowles [1998] AC 641, [1998] UKHL 16. He said that the purpose to be considered was the purpose for which the examining officers executed the stop. I believe none of this to be controversial. He then said: “21. [I]n deciding whether the statutory purpose is made out I do not think the court is limited to a consideration of the examining officers’ subjective state of mind. Given the context – the possible apprehension of terrorism – Parliament must have enacted Schedule 7 in the knowledge that there might be very good reasons why the examining officers (who might, as here, be junior in rank) should not be privy to the whole story. This is of a piece with D/Supt Stokley’s reference at paragraph 39 of his witness statement to “a firewall between the intelligence case and the examination, to prevent any unwitting disclosures to the subject of the examination”. It is noteworthy that by force of paragraph 2(4) of Schedule 7 an examining officer is not required to have any “grounds for suspecting that a person falls within section 40(1)(b)”. Nor does Schedule 7 provide that an examining officer must be the one to determine whether the subject appears to fall within that subsection. It may well be someone else, to whom the results of the stop are referred. 22. In a case like this the primary evidence for the determination of the stop’s purpose is likely to be the terms of the instructions given to the examining officers: here, in effect, the last PCS. Making the modest assumption that the officers will have executed their instructions in good faith, that ought to provide the essential, even if not the whole, rationale for the decision to carry out the stop. But I readily acknowledge that