03/02/2020 Economou v David De Freitas (Rev 1) [2016] EWHC 1853 (QB) (27 July 2016) support a reference innuendo: Grappelli v Derek Block (Holdings) Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 822. A limited exception to this rule was recognised in Hayward v Thompson [1982] QB 47, CA: a publisher may be liable where it defames an unnamed person who is identifiable to a small number, but later identifies that person to its readers generally. 11. The test that I have described is an objective one, which does not depend in any way on what the defendant knows or intends will happen: see Morgan v Odhams Press (above) and Baturina v Times Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 308, [2011] 1 WLR 1526, where Morgan and other well-known earlier authorities are reviewed. Some suggest that there is a subjective element, in the sense that a claimant has to prove that there were people who did in fact understand the words to refer to him. I do not believe this is the law: see Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2015] EWHC 2242 (QB), [2016] QB 402 [15] and Undre v Harrow LBC [2016] EWHC 931 (QB) [24-26], [31]. In Baturina the majority expressed the view that such evidence was not even admissible: see [56] (Sedley LJ) and [57] (Hooper LJ). This was obiter, but consistent with the view I take as to the objective nature of the test. It would not matter in this action, as the claimant's case does rely on evidence or inference of actual identification, as will normally be the position now that claimants have to prove Serious Harm. (2) Responsibility 12. A defendant will of course be held legally responsible for a communication which he personally made. He may also be responsible for the republication in the media of such a statement. Conventionally, those who write or speak to the media with a view to their words being re-published in the media are said to have "caused" or "authorised" such republication, and are responsible on that basis. A person will also be responsible for statements which he authorises others to make to the media on his behalf, with a view to re-publication. That is the way Mr Economou puts his case against Mr de Freitas in this action. He complains of words which he says Mr de Freitas spoke or wrote, or authorised others to write, to the media for publication in the media. He does not seek to hold Mr de Freitas responsible for any of the other matter which the media organisations concerned included in the articles and broadcasts that are complained of. (3) Meaning 13. It is an essential ingredient of any defamation claim that the statement complained of is defamatory of the claimant. At common law a statement is defamatory of a person if it substantially affects in an adverse manner the attitude of other people towards him, or has a tendency so to do: Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB), [2011] 1 WLR 1985 [96] (Tugendhat J). Whether that is so normally depends on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words. 14. In defamation law a given set of words can have only one natural and ordinary meaning. The principles by which the court identifies that single meaning are well-settled. Most are encapsulated in the summary given by Sir Anthony Clarke MR in Jeynes v News Magazines Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 130 at [14]: "(1) The governing principle is reasonableness. (2) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. (3) Over-elaborate analysis is best avoided. (4) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant. (5) The article must be read as a whole, and any "bane and antidote" taken together. (6) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. … (7) the court should rule out any meaning which "can only emerge as the product of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation. (8) … "it is not enough to say that, by some person or other, the words might be understood in a defamatory sense." 15. Another well-established principle is known as "the repetition rule". The relevant aspect of the rule is that "… words must be interpreted… by reference to the underlying allegations of fact and not merely … some second-hand report … of them": Shah v Standard Chartered Bank [1999] QB 241, 263. Put www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2016/1853.htm 4/58