47. I associate myself with the decision of the Court of Appeal (Kiage, JA) in Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 6 others [2013] eKLR that: “ I am not in the least persuaded that article 159 of the Constitution and the oxygen principles which both command courts to seek to do substantial justice in an ecient, proportionate and cost-eective manner and to eschew defeatist technicalities were ever meant to aid in the overthrow or destruction of rules of procedure and to create an anarchical free-for-all in the administration of justice. This court, indeed all courts, must never provide succour and cover to parties who exhibit scant respect for rules and timelines. Those rules and timelines serve to make the process of judicial adjudication and determination fair, just, certain and even-handed. Courts cannot aid in the bending or circumventing of rules and a shifting of goal posts for, while it may seem to aid one side, it unfairly harms the innocent party who strives to abide by the rules. I apprehend that it is in the even-handed and dispassionate application of rules that courts give assurance that there is clear method in the manner in which things are done so that outcomes can be anticipated with a measure of condence, certainty and clarity where issues of rules and their application are concerned.” 48. In the case of Hassan Ali Joho & another v Suleiman Said Shahbal & 2 others [2014]eKLR where the Supreme Court of Kenya observed in dealing with the question of timelines dictated by the Constitution and the Elections Act citing the Court of Appeal case, of Ferdinand Waititu v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, (IEBC) & 8 others, Civil Appeal No 137 of 2013 which provided as follows: “ These timelines set by the Constitution and the Elections Act are neither negotiable nor can they be extended by any court for whatever reason. It is indeed the tyranny of time, if we may call it so. That means a trial court must manage the allocated time very well so as to complete a hearing and determine an election petition timeously.” 49. The need to adhere to the constitutional timeframes was also emphasized in the cases of Martha Wangari Karua v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 others [2019] eKLR and Evans Odhiambo Kidero & 4 others v Ferdinard Ndungu Waititu & 4 others, SC Pet No 20 of 2014; [2014] eKLR. 50. Accordingly, it therefore follows that, as at the time of determination, January 6, 2022, the period within which the respondent had to investigate and determine the complaint had already lapsed. 51. I am in agree with applicants that pursuant to the provisions of section 56(5) of the Act the ODPC had a time-bound jurisdiction to investigate and determine the complaint. When the 90 days’ period ended, the respondent jurisdiction also came to an end by way euxion of time. 52. Courts and tribunals cannot out the timelines expressly provided for in law. 53. The moment the 90 days ended, the respondents jurisdiction also lapsed. The nding that was rendered outside time was without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity, bereft of any force of law. 54. Guided by the Supreme Court Judgment in the case SC Petitions 39 & 40 of 2019 Praxidis Namoni Saisi & 7 Others V DPP & 2 Others unlike the traditional Kenyan dispute resolution mechanisms like the court, the ODPC does not rely on the evidence produced by parties in making its decision. The ODPC has investigatory powers call for or collect and use more evidence before arriving at a nding. kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/258092/ 13