protest signs at a private funeral related to broad issues of interest to society at large and were matters of public import). Rather, the public has no legitimate interest in the private sexual activities of the victim or in the embarrassing facts revealed about her life. See United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012) (nonconsensual dissemination of a victim’s private nude photos “may be proscribed consistent with the First Amendment”). ¶ 57 In sum, section 11-23.5(b) does not pose such inherent dangers to free expression or present such potential for censorship or manipulation as to justify application of strict scrutiny. Therefore, the appropriate standard to apply is the intermediate level of first amendment scrutiny. See Turner Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. at 661-62. ¶ 58 3. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny ¶ 59 In the context of the first amendment’s guaranty of freedom of speech, intermediate scrutiny is variously described in similar forms. Generally, to survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must serve an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech and must not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further that interest or, in other words, must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest without unnecessarily interfering with first amendment freedoms, which include allowing reasonable alternative avenues of communication. See id. at 662; Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50; Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647-48; Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 36; People ex rel. Ryan v. World Church of the Creator, 198 Ill. 2d 115, 121 (2001). ¶ 60 Accordingly, in the context of the first amendment, fit matters. Even when the Supreme Court is not applying strict scrutiny, the court still requires a fit that is not necessarily perfect but reasonable, a fit that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served, a fit that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456-57 (2014). ¶ 61 In the case at bar, we conclude that section 11-23.5 serves a substantial government interest. “It is a traditional exercise of the States’ police powers to - 17 -