companies that provide access to the Internet, public mobile services, or private radio services. Id. § 11-23.5(d). ¶ 85 Based on the statutory terms set forth above, section 11-23.5 is narrowly tailored to further the important governmental interest identified by the legislature. Accordingly, we conclude the statute does not burden substantially more speech than necessary. ¶ 86 Also, we observe that reasonable avenues of communication remain. As the United States Supreme Court has “emphasized on more than one occasion, when a content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least instrusive means of serving the statutory goal.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 726. Under section 11-23.5, “[p]eople remain free to produce, distribute, and consume a vast array of consensually disclosed sexually explicit images. Moreover, they remain free to criticize or complain about fellow citizens in ways that do not violate the privacy rights of others.” Franks, supra, at 1326. Section 11-23.5, with its narrow tailoring, “does not come close to shutting down the vast number of ways in which people may vent their anger and aggression. The Internet has provided innumerable opportunities for aggressive and offensive interactions, and the First Amendment largely protects those opportunities. The First Amendment does not, however, protect the unauthorized distribution of personal, private, and intimate images unrelated to any public interest.” Id. at 1326-27. In this case, defendant makes no argument that her speech would have been in any way stifled by not attaching the victim’s private sexual images to her letter. We hold that section 11-23.5 satisfies intermediate scrutiny. ¶ 87 E. First Amendment Overbreadth ¶ 88 We have concluded that section 11-23.5 does not improperly restrict defendant’s freedom of speech as guaranteed by the first amendment. However, in support of the circuit court’s order, defendant alternatively contends that section 11-23.5(b) is facially unconstitutional because it is overbroad. We do not agree. - 27 -