¶ 89 The first amendment overbreadth doctrine looks not at whether a law improperly regulates speech based on viewpoint or content but at the appropriate scope of the regulation. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990) (recognizing that, where a statute regulates expressive conduct, it may be found to be unconstitutionally overbroad if it “criminalizes an intolerable range of constitutionally protected conduct”). Generally, a defendant seeking to assert a facial challenge would be required to establish that there is no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid. Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 24. However, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge a statute as a facial violation of the first amendment, even if that party’s conduct would not fall within the amendment’s protection. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); see also People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50; Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶¶ 14, 24. A facial challenge based on first amendment overbreadth is permitted out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may chill or deter constitutionally protected speech, particularly where the statute imposes criminal penalties. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 24; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 24. ¶ 90 Under the first amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). The doctrine operates to balance two competing social costs—the chilling effect on constitutionally protected speech against the invalidation of a law that is entirely constitutional in some of its applications. Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (citing Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119-20). In order to be unconstitutional, the overbreadth must be “substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 292-93 (citing Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 485 (1989), and Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615); see also Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473. “The ‘mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.’ ” Williams, 553 U.S. at 303 (quoting Members of City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)). Under intermediate scrutiny, a content-neutral statute is overbroad only when it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to advance its substantial governmental - 28 -