<284 para. 138> with further references), satisfy their duty of referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union under EU law. Indeed, the ordinary courts’ responsibility with regard to fundamental rights is not limited to complying with their duty of referral, and thus to ascertaining the principles of interpretation that their review must be based on under EU law. Rather, insofar as the interpretation of fundamental rights has been clarified, it falls to the ordinary courts to apply them in the individual case. In applying ordinary law in light of fundamental rights, they must typically reconcile different fundamental rights positions – as in the legal dispute at hand –, which requires a balancing that takes into consideration the specific circumstances and differs from case to case. The ordinary courts themselves are responsible for this specific application of the law; they cannot shift this responsibility to the Court of Justice of the European Union by making referrals to it. When interpreting fundamental rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union sets out general principles that must be applied to the specific case; it expects the national courts to duly implement these and to give specific shape to them, including in subsequent cases. In part, it leaves considerable latitude to the national courts in this respect (cf., e.g., CJEU, Judgment of 6 November 2003, Lindqvist, C-101/01, EU:C:2003:596, paras. 86 et seq., 90; Judgment of 9 March 2017, Manni, C-398/15, EU:C:2017:197, paras. 62 and 63; Judgment of 27 September 2017, Puškár, C-73/16, EU:C:2017:725, para. 72; cf. also Judgment of 19 October 2016, Breyer, C-582/14, EU:C:2016:779, para. 62). When it comes to matters that are fully harmonised under EU law, this latitude does not imply that the Court of Justice of the European Union recognises room for Member State diversity. Rather, through this arrangement the CJEU acknowledges that fundamental rights can only protect individuals effectively if they are specified in the context of the circumstances of the individual case, even in areas where the application of the law is meant to be uniform and homogeneous throughout the EU. Such specification falls to the ordinary courts in the Member States. 65 As the organ guaranteeing comprehensive fundamental rights protection at the domestic level, the Federal Constitutional Court must review the decisions of the ordinary courts in this respect. Yet this requires that the review exercised by the Federal Constitutional Court also include the EU fundamental rights, in addition to the standard of Art. 101(1) second sentence GG. 66 (5) Such an inclusion of EU fundamental rights is not precluded by the Constitution’s wording, in particular Art. 93(1) no. 4a GG. It is true that, despite the open wording of this provision, its legislative history is such that it only refers to the fundamental rights of the Basic Law. However, as Art. 23(1) first sentence GG mandates that the Federal Constitutional Court participate in the application of EU law within the framework of its responsibility with regard to European integration, it follows that Art. 93(1) no. 4a GG is to be applied accordingly to challenges asserting a violation of rights under the Charter. To the extent that this contradicts earlier decisions of the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court – which, in any case, did not refer specifically to the 67 14/36