tal rights frameworks reflect factual differences between the Member States resulting from various factors, including country-specific historical experiences. It cannot be assumed that the Charter, insofar as uniform fundamental rights protection is to apply in all Member States to fully harmonised EU law, corresponds with the Basic Law and is congruent with its guarantees in all details (cf. also BVerfG, Order of the First Senate also issued today - 1 BvR 16/13 -, para. 62). This holds true all the more given that fundamental rights protection in Germany is based on a long tradition of comprehensive case-law on fundamental rights that gives specific shape to the fundamental rights on the basis of the broad procedural powers of the Federal Constitutional Court within the German legal order. An interpretation of fully harmonised EU law in light of the fundamental rights of the Basic Law would thus run the risk of prematurely applying to EU law the standards developed domestically – this would then imply that these standards would also have to apply to the other Member States. 45 Thus, in relation to the legal order under the Basic Law, EU fundamental rights and domestic fundamental rights must be regarded as distinct regimes – irrespective of how other Member States handle this issue. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is the standard for the specific application of fully harmonised EU law by domestic authorities and courts. 46 bb) It is solely on the basis of the recognition of the precedence of application of EU law that the German fundamental rights are not applied as the relevant standard of review (cf. BVerfGE 123, 267 <398 et seq.>; 126, 286 <301 and 302>; 129, 78 <99>; 140, 317 <335 et seq. para. 37 et seq.> with further references); the validity of the fundamental rights of the Basic Law as such remains unaffected. They remain in force as the underlying dormant framework. In its established case-law, the Federal Constitutional Court only recognises the precedence of application of EU law, which rules out a review on the basis of the fundamental rights of the Basic Law, subject to the reservation that the protection afforded by the EU fundamental rights that apply instead must be sufficiently effective (cf. BVerfGE 73, 339 <376, 387>; 102, 147 <162 et seq.>; 118, 79 <95>; 129, 186 <199>; established case-law). The Basic Law puts the individual and the individual’s fundamental rights at the centre of its order, declares their essence and the core of human dignity to be inviolable (cf. Art. 19(2), Art. 79(3) GG) and also guarantees this protection with regard to the EU Treaties (cf. Art. 23(1) third sentence GG). Therefore, EU law can only prevail over the guarantees afforded by domestic fundamental rights if the protective guarantees of these fundamental rights are upheld in substance. It is thus necessary that the level of protection under the Charter be essentially equivalent to the fundamental rights protection that is regarded as indispensable under the Basic Law and that the Charter guarantee the essence of the fundamental rights in general (cf. BVerfGE 73, 339 <376, 387>; 102, 147 <162 et seq.>; 118, 79 <95>; 129, 186 <199>; established case-law). This examination of equivalence of the level of protection must be made on the basis of a general assessment of the respective fundamental rights guarantee in question. 47 9/36