MAJIEDT J [80] As has already been established, there are various types of abuse of process and the dictum in Maphanga does not apply to all of them. The characteristics of a SLAPP suit are plainly distinguishable from frivolous and vexatious proceedings and Maphanga therefore does not find application in this case. For example, SLAPP does not require the presence of a range of vexatious suits for the test to be met – just one suit would be sufficient. Maphanga may, however, find relevance in terms of the potential development of the common law in finding that determining a SLAPP suit requires an assessment of the merits. [81] The applicants concede that had the respondents as defendants pleaded that these proceedings constituted an abuse of process, taking into account all relevant factors, including motive and merits, they would not have been in a position to have raised an exception. It is the special plea, narrowly defined in terms of motive alone, which the applicants argue is problematic. In my view, this is correct. [82] As set out above, true SLAPP suits, as they operate in other jurisdictions, have particular features which require a more nuanced approach than simply ulterior purpose. It appears that both parties have used the term “abuse of process” too broadly and interchangeably with ulterior purpose and frivolous and vexatious proceedings, respectively. This is problematic in light of the fact that each of them relied on case law relating to a particular form of an abuse of process which have features and characteristics which are distinguishable from one another. A pure SLAPP suit defence is somewhat more nuanced than that of ulterior purpose and it seems to me that the respondents have conflated the two. It also does not fall within the category of frivolous and vexatious proceedings and the applicants’ reliance on Maphanga is misconceived. [83] What bears consideration is whether the defence as set out in the defendants’ special plea constitutes a good defence in our law. There is certainly room for an argument that where a court recognises a species of abuse of that kind, as either completely new or as a variation or expansion of an existing type of abuse, it does so 36