HURBAIN v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT
online in a digital archive, in similar fashion to a library making an archived
article available, constituted fresh disclosure for the purposes of the domestic
courts’ case-law.
36. In a judgment of 29 April 2016 the Court of Cassation dismissed the
appeal on points of law. It found that the applicant’s argument that the Court
of Appeal had derived the “right to be forgotten” online solely from the legal
literature and case-law, to which it had attributed general regulatory scope,
failed on factual grounds. The Court of Cassation held as follows:
“... It follows [from] the reasoning [of the Court of Appeal judgment], firstly, that the
judgment under challenge regards the right to be forgotten online as an ‘intrinsic
component of the right to respect for private life’ (and indeed states so), and views such
interference with the right to freedom of expression as may be justified in order to
protect that right as being based not on the legal literature and case-law – which the
judgment does not recognise as having general regulatory scope – but on Article 8 of
the [Convention], Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and Article 22 of the Constitution; and, secondly, that it refers to the judgment of the
Court of Justice of the European Union only to lend support to its view on the scope of
that right to be forgotten.”
37. The Court of Cassation further noted that the Court of Appeal had not
based the “right to be forgotten online” on the European or domestic
provisions concerning the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data, namely EU Directive 95/46/EC (see
paragraph 68 below) and the Belgian Act of 8 December 1992 (see
paragraph 49 below).
38. The Court of Cassation also held as follows:
“While Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which protect freedom of expression and, accordingly, press freedom,
give the print media the right to place digital archives online and give members of the
public the right to access those archives, these rights are not absolute and may in some
circumstances, within the strict limits laid down by those treaty provisions, yield to
other rights that are also worthy of respect.
The right to respect for private life, which is guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 22 of the Constitution,
and which – as acknowledged in this limb of the ground of appeal – encompasses the
right to be forgotten, allowing an individual found guilty of an offence to object in some
circumstances to his or her previous convictions being made public once more through
fresh disclosure of the facts, may justify interference with the right to freedom of
expression.
The digital archiving of an old press article which, at the time it was printed, reported
lawfully on past events that are now covered by the right to be forgotten, so construed,
is not exempt from possible interference with the right to freedom of expression in order
to protect the right to be forgotten.
Such interference may consist in altering the archived text so as to prevent or make
good a breach of the right to be forgotten.
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